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Mapping Utopia: Spatial and Temporal Sites 
of Meaning 
John C. Hawley 
In classic imaginings of places that are pointedly Not Here (More's Utopia 
itself, Swift's Gulliver's Travels, Butler's Erewhon, Hilton's lost Horizon, 
Hudson's Green Mansions, Barrie's Peter Pan) one could argue that such sites 
are proposed specifically to provide a unique angle of vision on the society 
against which they are "placed": their rules for living are offered as implied 
commentary on the (less acceptable) rules of the author's home land. In such 
worlds, the critique frequently enough casts the "real" world as a dystopia, one 
that may or may not be open to improvement. A softer version of the critique 
might be seen in works such as Thoreau's Walden, Adams 's Watership Down, 
and St. Augustine's The City of God, with their implied suggestion that this 
better world may, in some sense, be already present in front of our faces, had we 
but eyes to see. The fault is in ourselves, so the message goes, and we are 
offered hope that we may gain new eyes through a new way of seeing and, of 
course, ofbeing. 
An observation that links these two spatial envisionings of utopia 
would be that the effect that visiting such a place on the protagonist is, itself, of 
major interest to the authors. More often than not, one returns a changed 
individual, in some sense a better person but less able to accommodate oneself 
to the world others consider "ordinary"; such afflicted individuals are con-
sequently less acceptable to those who never left home. It is a reversal of the 
worldly adage, "How ya gonna keep 'em down on the farm, after they've seen 
Paree?": after Swift's protagonist visits the Houyhnhnms, the farm (or the 
stable, at least) doesn't look bad at all. 
In various other utopian journeys, though, the trip is as much temporal 
as it may be spatial. If I may be permitted a neologism, we might more suitably 
describe this literature as "uchronian" rather than utopian. Think, for example, 
of Wells's The Time Machine, Asimov's /, Robot, Clarke's Childhood's End, 
Bellamy's Looking Backward, Woolfs Orlando, various Kurt Vonnegut novels, 
innumerable Star Trek episodes. Some novels, like Rider Haggard's She, 
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combine the spatial and temporal defamiliarization apparently to transgress the 
rules of both (only to fall back into a rather stodgy late Victorian sense of the 
dangers of a woman not knowing her place): Ayesha ("she who must be 
obeyed") significantly claims that "[her] empire is of the imagination" (175). It 
is interesting to observe that the temporal fantasies are arguably, as often as not, 
dystopic as they look to the future; they are immobilizing as they look to the 
past, since one dare not disturb the time line-everything connects, everything 
depends, and in these stories the ethical demands of assassinating a Hitler 
usually get portrayed much like the hubris of a Faust or a Dr. Frankenstein. The 
reader learns that the devil one knows may be preferable to the one our 
intervention could release. 
In fact, for all the reforming impulse that one expects in utopian 
writing, at its heart is often conservative, sometimes paranoid, sometimes a self-
indulgent whistling past the graveyard. In some cases, like Baum's The Wizard 
of Oz, we may be asked to conclude rather comfortingly that "there 's no place 
like home"-and that, for all its fantastic amusement, those strange places that 
divert us for awhile are really the things of children, phases that one must pass 
through before seriously grappling with the nitty gritty responsibilities of 
adulthood-and grimly accepting that Kansas is as good as it's going to get. 
On the other hand, a less conservative view shapes stories like Blish 's 
A Case of Conscience, where it is the very foreignness of the "other" that frees 
the reader to reimagine his or her own world with fresh eyes that may require a 
new ethics to cope with responsibilities that are discernible only from far, far 
away. Many of these more exploratory utopian books seem reminiscent of 
Tennyson's account of an aging Ulysses, home at last from Troy but restless, 
finally leaving the rule to his son Telemachus so that he, aging though he may 
be, may strike out to the territory ahead, the new frontier. In an optimism that 
seeks, perhaps, to shout down the terrors of secularization, the loss of a sacred 
canopy, the rationalization of an empty universe, these works show the 
essentially romantic underpinnings of both utopias and dystopias-the hope 
(sometimes disguised as a fear) that there may be some "other" time and place, 
accessible to few of us, of course, but perhaps available to the individual 
reading the book. The "umealistic," even self-indulgent nature of this imagining 
of the enterprise perhaps provides the underpinning for Judith Shklar's sad 
observation that "utopia and utopian have mostly come to designate projects that 
are not just fantasies but also ones that will end in ruin" ( 41 ). 
And this connects us to the analysis Huntington brings to H. G. Wells. 
After discussing the mirror relations between utopian and dystopian writing, 
Huntington defines anti-utopian fiction, by which he means 
a type of skeptical imagining that is opposed to the consistencies of utopia-dystopia. If 
the utopian-dystopian form tends to construct single, fool-proof structures which solve 
social dilemmas, the anti-utopian form discovers problems, raises questions, and doubts . . 
. . . It is a mode of relentless inquisition, of restless skeptical exploration of the very 
articles of faith on which utopias themselves are built. .... It is not an attack on reality 
but a criticism of human desire and expectation. . . .It enjoys the construction of 
imaginary community, but it does not succumb to the satisfactions of solutions. By the 
same mechanism the anti-utopia can acknowledge virtues in dystopia even while 
denouncing it. At the core of the anti-utopia is, not simply an ideal or a nightmare, but an 
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awareness of conflict, of deeply opposed values that pure utopia and dystopia tend to 
override. If utopia seeks imaginative solutions, anti-utopia goes beyond to return to the 
powerful and disturbing ambivalences that come from perceiving simultaneous yet 
conflicting goods. (Huntington 142-43) 
Thus, Huntington's usage of the term (and my own) are not to be confused with 
Krishan Kumar's, which seems roughly to equate it to dystopian writing (Kumar 
99- 130). 
Without detailing Huntington's reading of Wells's career, which, in 
brief, he describes as a movement from "anti-utopian imaginings to utopian 
prophetic ones" (143)-in other words, as an increasingly conservative 
movement- I wish to refer to his study principally for this insight into the anti-
utopian. Though Huntington does not seem to make the connection between 
this and postmodemism, they share in common a distrust of endings or of 
systems; this goes far in explaining some recent science fiction and fantasy that 
raise more questions than they answer. In Wells's case, his late fiction loses 
some of its power because, in trying to become engaged with the problems of 
the world and therefore trying to offer solutions in his later utopian novels and 
stories, he is too aware of discrepancies in the world to propose convincing 
(utopian) solutions. As Huntington notes, "a writer less attuned to the anti-
utopian ironies of the world might succeed better at ignoring them" (147). But, 
grasping at straws to force a solution, the late Wells (as in When the Sleeper 
Wakes) sometimes "prefers the unambiguous horror of dystopia which, [he] 
implies, might be transformed to utopia" (148). 
Huntington observes that this dilemma is the same for many utopian 
writers: 
the deep structural contradictions cannot be mediated. Either, as in the case of 
Zamyatin 's We, we commit ourselves to an infinitely dialectical anti-utopianism, or, as in 
the case of Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four or, in a different spirit, Bradbury's Fahrenheit 
451 or Huxley's Brave New World, we quash ironic conflict and replace the puzzle with 
a single-valued structure, either dystopian or utopian . ( 148) 
In short, Huntington notes that anti-utopia, which resists the wiles of both utopia 
and, ironically, dystopia, is an unsettling mixture of "yearning and skepticism" 
( 149). 
But there is another way of viewing this dynamic, as posed by the 
philosopher Paul Ricoeur. In his Lectures on Ideology and Utopia he joins 
together much of what Huntington criticizes in utopian and dystopian literature 
and calls it ideology-the drive toward integration, system, institution, dogma. 
Utopia, on the other hand, is "the constant ideal, that toward which we are 
directed but which we never fully attain" (xxi) . It "functions to expose the gap 
between the authority's claim for and the citizenry's beliefs in any system of 
legitimacy" (xxii). 
On the other hand, according to Ricoeur utopian writing has a darker 
side as well, because it can regress into "the completely unrealizable" and 
become fancy, madness, or escape: 
Here utopia eliminates questions about the transmission between the present and the 
utopian future; it offers no assistance in determining or in proceeding on the difficult path 
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of action. Further, utopia is escapist not only as to the means of its achievement, but as to 
the ends to be achieved. In utopia no goals conflict; all ends are compatible. (xxii) 
This escape from consequences, Ricoeur calls "the magic of thought." He 
therefore pushes for the ethical component possible in utopian writing, noting 
that "we must try to cure the illnesses of utopias by what is wholesome in 
ideology ... and try to cure the rigidity, the petrification, of ideologies by the 
utopian element" (xxiii). 
However, lest Ricoeur suffer criticism from such as Huntington for 
being naive, we should note his emphasis on the process, on the "conflict of 
interpretations," on the paradigm shifts involved in conflicting metaphors for the 
ever-newly-coming-into-being of truth (xxix). As he writes, "we wager on a 
certain set of values and then try to be consistent with them; verification is 
therefore a question of our whole life. No one can escape this" (xxiii). 
I will conclude with a brief example from two recent books that 
illustrate aspects of the two structures I have alluded to in this paper. One is 
Ken Grimwood's 1986 temporal utopia, Replay; the other is Mary Doria 
Russell's spatial dystopia, The Sparrow ( 1996). Russell tells the story of a 
combined scientific and missionary journey gone very bad. Only one explorer 
returns to earth, the Jesuit priest Emilio Sandoz. When he had been introduced, 
finally, to a leader of Rakhat (the target planet) his life had apparently suddenly 
come into a meaningful focus. Here is his reaction: 
And then, suddenly, everything made sense to him, and the joy of the moment took his 
breath away. He had been brought here, step by step, to meet this man: Hlavin Kitheri , a 
poet-perhaps even a prophet- who of all his kind might know the God whom Emilio 
Sandoz served. It was a moment of redemption so profound he almost wept, ashamed 
that his faith had been so badly eroded by the inchoate fear and the isolation. He tried to 
pull himself together, wishing he'd been stronger, more durable, a better instrument for 
his God's design. And yet he felt purified somehow, stripped of all other purpose. 
(Russell 390) 
But the encounter turns violent. The priest is continuously raped. 
Hlavin Kitheri then writes poetry rapturously describing the experience. Sandoz 
suddenly realizes that it was just such poetry, now revealed as pornography, that 
had reminded his fellow priests of religious music and had lured him to the 
planet in the first place. In short, his hermeneutical structure, his controlling 
metaphor, his paradigm of meaning, has been eviscerated. One might say he is 
experiencing the open-endedness that Huntington describes as anti-utopia, or the 
conflict of interpretations that Ricoeur posits as the dynamic for an engaged 
ethics that is both meaningful and non-ideological. But the others around him, 
and one suspects the author and most readers, as well, insist on bringing closure 
(and meaning) to the experience. His religious superiors remark: 
"He's the genuine article . . . He is still held fast in the formless stone, but he's closer 
to God right now than I have ever been in my whole life." (400) 
"Emilio is not despicable. But God didn't rape him, even if that's how Emilio 
understands it now." He sat back in the bench and stared at the ancient olive trees 
defining the edge of the garden . "There's an old Jewish story that says in the beginning 
God was everywhere and everything, a totality. But to make creation, God had to remove 
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Himself from some part of the universe, so something besides Himself could exist. So he 
breathed in, and in the places where God withdrew, there creation exists." ( 40 I) 
Even as they recognize that he is in process ("held fast in the formless stone") 
they insist on stepping outside that process themselves and finding a false stasis 
that seems utopian in the extreme. "I don 't even have the courage to envy him" 
(400), one priest remarks, failing to acknowledge that his own situation, in stark 
existential terms, is not that different from his rape victim's: both are still 
engaged, and can determine meaning for that process only in a never-to-be-
achieved retrospect. 
Ken Grimwood's novel, on the other hand, seems tailor-made as a 
parable of utopian possibilities that are open-ended, but it issues forth into a 
rather remarkably ambiguous (postmodern) conclusion. The protagonist, Jeffrey 
Winston, dies in 1998 but suddenly finds his consciousness back in his 1963 
body and circumstances. He brings with him all his knowledge of what is now 
the future, and he makes choices accordingly- making spectacularly successful 
bets on the World Series and the stock market. Then he dies again in 1988, and 
is reborn a bit later than the first time. This happens again and again, with the 
time before death shortening with each replay. And in each life he makes new 
choices, finally meeting a woman in similar "replaying" circumstances. A 
unique love affair ensues (over several half-lifetimes). Finally they both 
approach what appears to be their final death, but their ordinary lives 
surprisingly resume and continue forward from 1988. 
Comparisons might be made to Bierce's story, "An Occurrence at Owl 
Creek Bridge," and the films Groundhog Day (1993), Forever Young (1992), 
Sliding Doors ( 1998), and others. But the most telling comparison, perhaps, 
might be with the recent film Pleasantville (1998), where the people in black 
and gray in 1958 are portrayed as neo-fascist in their commitment to a "non-
changist view of history, emphasizing continuity." When they once take a 
chance, express an uncomfortable emotion, do something out of character, they 
suddenly take on a bit of color. But their lives, of course, become less 
predictable, and more dangerous. Along similar lines, and sounding much like 
Paul Ricoeur, Replay 's protagonist concludes as his life moves into 1989 and 
beyond: 
Each lifetime had been different, as each choice is always different, unpredictable in its 
outcome or effect. Yet those choices had to be made . ... And yet, he mused, the years 
themselves would all be fresh and new [now], an ever-changing panoply of unforeseen 
events and sensations that had been denied him until now. New films and plays, new 
technology developments, new music- Christ, how he yearned to hear a song, any song, 
that he had never heard before! The unfathomable cycle in which he and Pamela had 
been caught had proved to be a form of confinement, not release .... Now everything 
was different. This wasn't "next time," and there would be no more of that; there was 
only this time, this sole finite time of whose direction and outcome Jeff knew absolutely 
nothing. He would not waste, or take for granted, a single moment of it . . . The 
possibilities, Jeff knew, were endless. (Grimwood 309- 310) 
This very didactic conclusion may be typical of utopian literature. Perhaps the 
ending could even be confused with that of The Wizard of Oz- but the focus is 
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not on "home" but on movement in time. The joy Jeff experiences is not 
because he has found security: in fact, with the irony typical of anti-utopian 
writing, he senses the energy and rectitude of the fact that, even though the 
possibilities are endless, he is not. 
Even this bittersweet sense of an ending cannot long dwell in the 
imaginative invention of that apparent closure. The hand of the clock moves 
beyond the moment of imaginative surety, and the actual life remains open-
ended. This is the sort of contemporary writing that acknowledges, with a 
hopeful brio, the deconstructive tum of postmodemism. The trick is to avoid 
paralysis . "Between the presently unrealizable and the impossible in principle 
lies an intermediary margin" (301), in Ricoeur's analysis, and it is on that 
intermediary border that we must tentatively enter utopian thinking. Rather than 
attempt to step outside time or space "we must let ourselves be drawn into the 
circle"- and then, in a mystical logic that utopias would applaud, he adds that 
we "must try to make the circle a spiral" (312). 
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